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NOTE
REGULATION OF TIME SHARING IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the bad reputation that time sharing' has acquired
in its twelve years of existence,2 through reports of scams and
questionable sales tactics, the industry's sales in 1984 were
about $1.7 billion, nearly three times the 1979 level.' Part of the
reason for this growth in sales has been the huge market for
time sharing among middle class families. Holiday Inn founder
Kemmons Wilson, who recently completed a model time sharing
resort near Orlando, Florida, said of time sharing, "It's the only
way I know that the average person can have a second home."
'4
Time sharing is an appealing investment for many vacation-
ers who are unwilling to pay the inflated rates charged by resort
area hotels and unable to afford the price of vacation homes of
their own. While purchasers can expect to pay between 50,000
and 300,000 dollars for ownership in a resort condominium that
they may only use once a year, they can purchase a time seg-
ment of occupancy in a similar unit for only 2,000 to 6,000 dol-
l. South Carolina's Statute uses the expression "vacation time sharing." See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-32-10 to -240 (Supp. 1985). The term "time sharing" is derived from the
computer industry. When computers were still very expensive, service companies main-
tained pools of computers and rented processing time or timesharing to users. Gray, Pio-
neering the Concept of Time-Sharing Ownership, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1196, 1197
(1974).
2. In 1983, one commentator stated: "The time-sharing concept of property owner-
ship is now ten years old." August, Clockwork Condo: The Time sharing Condominium
Stumbles into Court, 11 REAL ESTATE L.J. 203, 203 (1983).
3. Paris, The Auctioneer's Song, FORBES, March 25, 1985, at 102, 102.
4. Rock, Time Shares: Paradise or Palm Treed Squalor, MONEY, June 1985, at 120,
126. See also August, supra note 2, at 204. ("Of the 65 million American families, 31.5
million can afford this form of recreational housing, while only 1.3 million can afford to
purchase a second home outright").
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lars per week, plus a yearly maintenance fee.5 In addition, be-
cause exchange networks are usually offered to time-sharing
owners, the consumer'can avoid repetitive vacations to the same
resort, which necessarily result from condominium ownership."
Developers, on the other hand, have been attracted by the enor-
mous market for time shares and the attendant potential for
profit. When condominium developers experienced financial
troubles during the recession of the mid-1970s, they perceived
time sharing as a possible solution.7
The recent growth" in the time-sharing industry has not
come about without its problems. The concept has been sub-
jected to considerable criticism by commentators.' The well-
publicized reports of fraud, misrepresentation, and other malfea-
sance perpetrated by some time-sharing developers10 have made
5. Dickerson, Consumer Statutes and Class Actions Make It Feasible, NAT'L L.J.,
June 7, 1982, at 44, 44, col. 1.
6. Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Time-Sharing, 57 O. L. REv. 31, 32 (1977). One
commentator has provided the following description of the exchange networks:
[T]here are exchange companies that are in the business of facilitating ex-
changes or trades on any time-share owners in various locales. For example,
the use of 1/52 of a condo in Hawaii in perpetuity may get boring after two or
three visits. In this event the time-share owner may wish to vacation elsewhere
without losing the perceived benefit of his investment. This can be accom-
plished by exchanging the use of a Hawaii time-share for someone else's Lake
Tahoe time-share and so forth. The exchange companies list time-shares avail-
able for trading and charge a fee for performing this service.
Dickerson, supra note 5, at 44, col. 2-3.
7. Comment, Recent Developments in Florida Timesharing: Good News and Bad
for the Timeshare Consumer, 13 STETSON L. REV. 591, 593 (1984).
8. The number of time-share offerings totaled 8 in 1973, 95 in 1976, and 120-50 in
1977. See Gunnar, supra note 6, at 32 n.4. Today there are 70 time share offerings in
South Carolina. Interview with Kenneth Hagreen, then General Counsel for the South
Carolina Real Estate Commission, in Columbia, South Carolina (November 5,
1985)[hereinafter cited as Hagreen Interview].
9. See, e.g. Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Dargan, 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 689, 174
Cal. Rptr. 136, 148 (1981)(Gardner, J. dissenting)("Timesharing is a remarkable gim-
mick. P.T. Barnum would have loved it. It ordinarily brings enormous profits to the
seller and in this case would bring chaos to other residents."); Rock, supra note 4, at 120
("What you should look out for, in addition to suede-shoe sales tactics, is shaky financial
foundations."); Dickerson, supra note 5, at 44 Col. 1 (time sharing is "a new vacation
concept often promoted by high pressure salesmen using many of the flim-flam
techniques").
10. For a classic example of the magnitude of abuses in the industry, see United
States v. Weiwasser, No. CR85-139V (W.D. Wash. May 3, 1985). In that case the devel-
oper intentionally misrepresented and concealed facts about the accommodations, facili-
ties, and benefits available to purchasers. A preliminary injunction was entered as the
result of a complaint by the FTC that the defendant had violated the Federal Trade
2
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the general public wary of the time-sharing concept.1 For exam-
ple, in a March 1983 survey of time-share purchasers, thirty-five
percent said negative publicity had caused them to hesitate
before purchasing. 2 In addition, many prospective purchasers
are dissuaded by the complexity and novelty of the property re-
lationship with the developer and with other time-share owners.
All this negative publicity has had its impact on the industry.
The time-sharing industry continues to expand, however,
despite the potential for consumer dissatisfaction and for fraud
by unscrupulous developers. A major reason for this growth,
even in the face of substantial criticism, can be found in the at-
tempts by many states to address the industry's problems
through legislation. In 1975 Utah amended its Condominium
Ownership Act to include time-sharing interests within its act's
statutory definitions.' 3 In 1978 South Carolina joined the van-
guard of states enacting statutes to regulate time sharing.14 In
1979, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the Uniform Real Estate Time Share Act (URETSA), 15
and in 1980 representatives of the time-sharing industry itself
entered the regulation field by drafting the Model Time-Share
Ownership Act, which Nebraska adopted in the same year.'6
Currently, there are twenty-one states that regulate time sharing
either independently or in connection with a condominium
statute.'
7
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No.
C811160V (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 1981)(preliminary injunction entered). The defendant,
however, continued to sell time shares in direct violation of the injunction. The devel-
oper sold weeks to more than 2,500 people by showing them sales brochures depicting
condominiums in Hawaii. As it turned out, the development had fewer than 20 Hawaian
units. When people complained, they were told they could get a motel room in Ocean
Shores or an apartment on Lake Tahoe.
11. Comment, supra note 7, at 594-95.
12. Id. at 595 (citing Richard Ragatz Assoc., Inc., Purchasers of Timeshare Inter-
vals in Florida: Who Are They, Why They Buy 35 (1983)).
13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-3(7) (Supp. 1982).
14. Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act, No. 640, 1978 S.C. Acts 1897 (codified as
amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -240 (Supp. 1985)).
15. Reprinted in M. HENZE, THE LAW AND BusmEss OF TIME-SHARE RESORTS app. 6
(1982). The Resort Time-sharing Council of the American Land Development Associa-
tion and the National Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials have adopted
this act. The Nebraska version is found at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -1741 (1981).
16. Reprinted in M. HENZE, supra note 15, app. 5.
17. The following state statutes regulate time sharing: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-
2197 to -2197.17 (Supp. 1985); AR STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1301 to -1338 (Supp. 1985); CAL.
1986l
3
Brodie: Regulation of Time Sharing in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
As long as the time-sharing industry continues to grow, both
consumers and developers will continue to encounter problems.
The South Carolina legislature made a start at addressing these
problems by enacting the Vacation Time Sharing Act (the Act)
in 1978.18 This young industry, however, continues to generate
new problems that will require new legislative solutions. This is
particularly true in a coastal state like South Carolina, which is
the site of much resort property and a rapidly growing time-
sharing industry.1 9
II. THE TIME-SHARING CONCEPT
The origins of the time-sharing concept can be traced to the
condominium and the concept that an individual could own "a
subdivision of the airspace within a building located on the sur-
face of real estate. '20 This concept led, inevitably, to the recog-
nition that an individual could also own, jointly with other "time
sharers," a specified period of time in a condominium unit. This
joint ownership of time period units is time sharing.
A. Fee Ownership
Time sharing can be divided into two major categories: fee
ownership and nonfee ownership. Under the fee ownership
scheme, a purchaser receives an infinite possessory ownership in-
terest, which can be sold, devised, conveyed, encumbered, and
ADMIN. CODE §§ 2810-2813.13 (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-33-101 to -111 (1978 &
Supp, 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-103(W) to -103(bb) (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT.
ANN.§§ 721.01-.30 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 44-3-160 (Supp. 1985); HAWAI
REV. STAT. § 514E (Supp. 1983); LA. REv. STAT. § 9:1131.1-.30 (West Supp. 1986); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-593 (Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1701 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 119A.010-.710; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:3 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 43A-39
(1985); Oa. REV. STAT. §§ 94.803-.945 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10 to -240 (Supp.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-15B-1 to -7 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-32-101
(1982 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-3(7) (1953 & Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 55-
360 (1981 & Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-9-1 to -26 (Michie 1985).
18. No. 640, 1978 S.C. Acts 1847 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10
to -240 (Supp. 1985)).
19. In 1984 Marriott Corp. took over four projects on Hilton Head Island and now
has plans to build or buy others. Rock, supra note 4, at 121.
20. Straw, Representing a Purchaser of a Time Share, 11 CoLo. LAW. 1543, 1544
(1982).
[Vol. 37
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mortgaged. 21 Fee time sharing, or time-share ownership, (TSO),
is based on the common-law concepts of the estate for years,
tenancy in common, and interval estate.22 The purchaser is given
"an undivided interest in the fee, coupled with an exclusive right
of occupancy during designated time periods. ' 23 Under a varia-
tion of the TSO, known as "interval ownership," purchasers re-
ceive the exclusive right to use the unit during fixed periods,
coupled with a remainder in a tenancy in common to all the pur-
chasers. During the estate for years, title to a time-share unit
circulates among interval owners according to a recurring fixed
schedule, vesting in each owner for a period of time until a date
certain when title vests in all the owners as tenants in
common.
24
B. Nonfee Ownership
There are two forms of nonfee ownership. The first is the
nonownership variety, which includes both the "right-to-use," or
"vacation" lease, and the vacation license. The second is the
part ownership variety, which is an agreement to purchase stock
or a membership rather than an interest derived from real
property.
Under the right-to-use or vacation lease, the developer re-
tains title, while the purchaser obtains, in effect, a prepaid lease
of a designated unit for a fixed period each year. When the lease
expires, the right to occupy reverts to the developer or owner of
the fee simple. This type of lease provides advantages for devel-
opers and purchsers. Because they retain a fee interest, develop-
ers can use the equity to secure loans and profit from any appre-
ciation in the units' value. Purchasers, on the other hand, enjoy
the advantage of avoiding responsibility for taxes, management,
mortgage payments, insurance, closing costs, or any other attrib-
utes of home ownership.25 Purchasers, however, are subject to
several disadvantages as well: They have no control over man-
21. M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 3.03-.04.
22. Straw, supra note 20, at 1544. In Straw's discussion of the forms, he equates the
estate for years with the interval estate. Other authors have treated them as separate
concepts. See, e.g., M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 3.03[4].
23. Gunnar, supra note 6, at 33.
24. M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 3.03-.04.
25. Id. § 3.02[3][a].
1986]
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agement, are subject to any contractual conditions in the lease,
and run the risk that the fee owners may encumber the property
until it is eventually foreclosed.26
A vacation license is little different from a vacation lease. A
license is merely a prepaid option or permission to use the devel-
oper's property for a fixed period of time. The interest in a vaca-
tion license is merely contractual, and the licensee acquires no
interest in the real property itself.
2 7
Under the part-ownership form of nonfee time sharing, the
developer forms a corporation, club, nonprofit corporation, or
limited partnership consisting of persons interested in owning
time shares. If the corporate form is used, owners purchase
shares entitling them to the right to occupy a unit. With the
club form, the club holds the units for the use of the members.
Members acquire a right to use a unit owned by the club
through payment of membership and maintenance fees. When a
limited partnership is used, a corporation is formed to be the
general partner and manager, while the time-share owners are
the limited partners. This nonownership form is far less common
than a vacation license, vacation lease, or fee ownership.2"
Myriad forms of ownership interests are available. Few pro-
spective purchasers are aware of the various options or under-
stand what interest they are actually purchasing. Although state
regulation of time sharing can resolve some of the problems, the
complexity of the time-sharing concept suggests that purchasers
would be wise to retain an attorney so that they will know what
they are buying and be able to avoid unnecessary
disappointments.
III. REGULATION PRIOR TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S TIME-SHARE ACT
Prior to passage of the Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act29
time-share purchasers in South Carolina had little substantive
protection. They assumed a huge risk and had only common-law
rights on which to rely.
26. Id. § 3.02[3].
27. Id. § 3.02[4].
28. M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 3.02[5]-[7].
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -240 (Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 37
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A. State Regulation Prior to the Act
At the state level, time sharing could probably have been
regulated, if at all, only under the Horizontal Property Act,
which governs condominium sales.30 This statute's major draw-
back for time-share purchasers is its failure to provide any ex-
tensive disclosure requirements, 31 a crucial safeguard for time-
share purchasers. In addition, the statute imposes no restrictions
on developers' advertising campaigns and provides no assurance
that management associations would be properly structured.
Some time-sharing offers would not even have come within the
scope of the condominium statute because they are not recog-
nized as interests in land. In general, a condominium statute is
simply not equipped to protect consumers or to regulate time-
sharing developers.32
B. Federal Regulation
The federal government is, in some respects, better
equipped than states to regulate time sharing. While a state can
reach only in-state time-share offers, federal statutes, such as
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), can
protect consumers from deceptive and fraudulent sales practices
in interstate commerce. Most time-sharing offers, however, can-
not be reached under the ILSFDA because that statute exempts
from its coverage the sale of lots on which there is a completed
building or for which the developer is under a contractual obli-
gation to complete a building within two years of the date of the
sale. 3 4 As a result, the primary regulatory device available to the
federal government is the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 5
With an increasing number of states now regulating time shar-
ing, the need for the federal regulation has diminished. Even
30. Id. §§ 27-31-10 to -440 (1976).
31. On the importance of full disclosure in time-share transactions, see infra notes
40-41 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of regulating time sharing under condominium statutes, see
Gerando, Timesharing, 29 UCLA L. REv. 907, 934-35 (1982).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-02 (1982).
34. Id. § 1702(a)(2).
35. Id. § 45. In 1982 the Federal Trade Commission Act was used in a case of sub-
stantial abuse in the time-sharing industry. See FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club,
No. C811160V (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 1981); supra note 10.
1986]
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some municipalities are now regulating time sharing through lo-
cal ordinances.3
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S RESPONSE: THE VACATION TIME
SHARING PLANS ACT
A. Consumer Protection Orientation
Recognizing the need for legislation to provide consumer
protection and effective regulation of time-share developers,
South Carolina enacted its own time-sharing act in 1978. South
Carolina was one of the first states in the nation to enact a com-
prehensive time-sharing act, and since its enactment, the Vaca-
tion Time Sharing Plans Act 37 has brought respectability to the
industry and culled unscrupulous developers.
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the consumer
through strict enforcement of broad registration requirements
for developers.38 To achieve this purpose, the Act requires, inter
alia, full, fair, and accurate disclosure to the South Carolina
Real Estate Commission. First, the developer must make proof
of ownership and of a proper organizational structure, including
a mortgage deed, time-share declaration, and a management
company. Second, the developer must provide insurance and fol-
low the procedures for transfer of clear title. Third, the devel-
oper must maintain an escrow account to insure proper payment
of the underlying mortgage and to make refunds to the pur-
chaser who decides to cancel. Finally, the developer must pro-
vide certain disclosures in the contract that the consumer re-
ceives.39 These disclosure requirements are intended to protect
consumers from unscrupulous marketing and sales practices and
to insure that consumers receive what they have been promised.
To protect consumers, the Act requires that the contract
contain the following disclosures: (1) the actual date of the con-
tract; (2) the name and address of the seller; (3) a statement, in
close proximity to the signature, that the buyer may cancel
36. See, e.g., LAS VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE ch. 47, tit. V (1921); VAIL, COLO., ORDI-
NANCES 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 36 (1980), reprinted in UV HENZE, supra note 15, app. 8.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -240 (Supp. 1985).
38. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
39. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-20, -90, -100 (Supp. 1985).
534 [Vol. 37
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within four days;4 (4) the total financial obligation of the pur-
chaser; (5) the names of any businesses that could affect the
purchaser's rights and the contract's conditions; (6) the nature
and duration of the agreement; (7) a bold-faced typed state-
ment, in "immediate proximity" to the signature, that the pur-
chaser should not rely on any representations not included in
the contract; (8) the date of the availability of amenities; and (9)
the specific term of the contract.41 The primary protection af-
forded consumers by the Act is the four-day right to cancel and
obtain a full refund. 2
The responsibility for enforcing and implementing the in-
tent of the Act is entrusted to the South Carolina Real Estate
Commission. 43 The Commission attempts to accomplish this
purpose through registering new time-share plans, auditing vari-
ous escrow accounts, and licensing developers. The attorney gen-
eral is authorized, at the request of the Real Estate Commis-
sioner, to prosecute any alleged violations."
B. Forms of Time Sharing Covered by the Act
The scope of the Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act is broad
enough to cover any of the time-sharing forms previously dis-
cussed.45 The Act defines a "vacation time sharing ownership
plan" as
any arrangement, plan or similar devise, whether by tenancy in
common, sale, deed or by other means... whereby the pur-
chaser receives an undivided ownership interest ... for a spe-
cific period of time during any given year, but not necessarily
for consecutive years, which extends for a period of more than
one year.
46
A "vacation time sharing lease plan" is defined as
any arrangement, plan, or similar devise, whether by member-
ship agreement, lease, rental agreement, license, use agree-
40. Id. § 27-32-40(1)-(3).
41. Id. § 27-32-100(1)-(6).
42. Id. § 27-32-40. See infra notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
43. Id. § 27-32-130.
44. Id. § 27-32-130.
45. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
46. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 27-32-10(8) (Supp. 1985).
1986] 535
9
Brodie: Regulation of Time Sharing in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment, security or other means, whereby the purchaser receives
a right to use accommodations or facilities or both, but does
not receive an undivided fee simple interest in the property,
for a specific period of time during any given year, but not nec-
essarily for consecutive years, and which extends for a period
of more than one year.
47
A "vacation time sharing plan," as used in the Act, refers to ei-
ther of the above.48 Although the Act applies to all the fee and
nonfee ownership forms, it does not cover time-share exchange
networks:
Such lease plans do not include an arrangement or agree-
ment whereby a purchaser in exchange for an advance fee and
yearly dues is entitled to select from a designated list facilities
located in more than one state accommodations, of companies
which operate nationwide in at least nine states in the United
States through franchises or ownership, for a specified time pe-
riod and at reduced rates and under which no interest in real
property is transferred."
The Act's definitions also exclude from its coverage a family-
type time share when several tenancies in common are created
in a single family unit. The Act provides that "the provisions of
this chapter shall not be applicable to. . . the sale of real estate
by anyone who is the owner thereof or who owns any interest
therein."' 0
The definitions of the various forms of time sharing in the
Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act follow closely Florida's Real
Estate Time-Sharing Act,"1 which "has been widely acclaimed as
the most comprehensive and innovative act passed to date.
'5 2
Like the Florida statute, but unlike the Model Act, 53 the South
Carolina Act distinguishes between fee and nonfee forms of time
sharing. These distinctions are important because the two forms
are so different and, consequently, the rights of the parties
should also be different.
47. Id. § 27-32-10(9).
48. Id. § 27-32-10(10).
49. Id. § 27-32-10(9).
50. Id. § 27-32-10(7).
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721 (Harrison 1983).
52. M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 9.03[2], at 9-8.
53. See supra note 15.
[Vol. 37
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One of the Act's flaws is that it never explicitly recognizes
time sharing as ownership of real property. The condominium
statutes specifically recognize ownership of condominiums as
real property interests in order to avoid legal problems of title
and to make the concept acceptable to lenders, title insurance
companies, purchasers, and developers. 54 If the time-sharing act
had recognized time sharing as a property interest, time-share
purchasers could enjoy similar benefits.
Another defect in the Act's definitions is the failure to ad-
dress the creation of time shares by the owners of condominiums
and homes in previously established projects. The California
Court of Appeals confronted such a conversion in Laguna
Royale Owners Association v. Darger5
In that case the owners of an ocean front condominium
sought to sell shares in their apartment to two or three other
couples. 6 The court held invalid an agreement prohibiting con-
dominium occupants from transferring or assigning their inter-
ests in the unit without the consent of the owners' association.
The condominium "owners" were, therefore, free to sell time-
share interests in their unit.
If this situation had arisen in South Carolina, the owners
would have been exempt from the provisions of the time-sharing
Act because they were owners."" They could establish time
shares in a previously existing project against the will of the
other owners and without complying with the terms of the time-
sharing act.
The drafters of URETSA foresaw this problem, but failed
to address it adequately. This act provides that "time shares
may not be created in any unit in a project unless expressly per-
mitted by the project unit. ' 59 A single individual, such as the
owner in Laguna Royale, however, could satisfy this require-
ment if "[80] percent of the units . . . consent. ' 60 Thus, the
South Carolina Act fails to protect associations of current own-
54. See Johnakin, Legislation for Time Share Ownership Projects, 10 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 607, 608 (1975).
55. 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981).
56. Id. at 673-79, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 138-41.
57. Id. at 688, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
58. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10(7) (Supp. 1985).
59. UNIF. REAL ESTATE TIME-SHARE ACT § 2-101 (1980). See supra note 15.
60. Id. § 2-101.
1986]
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ers at all, and URETSA provides only limited protection.
C. Registration Requirements
Most of the Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act is devoted to
the elaborate requirements that must be met before a vacation
time-sharing plan can be registered in South Carolina. In order
to register a time-sharing plan, the seller must provide the Real
Estate Commission with the following items: (1) a copy of the
contract establishing the rights and responsibilities of the par-
ties; (2) copies of any promotional brochures or advertisements;
(3) a statement of the type of business entity selling the plans,
along with a list of the names and addresses of all personnel; (4)
copies of all contracts between the entity and the business pro-
viding the accommodations; (5) copies of all rules on the use of
the accommodations; (6) a statement of all existing liens; (7) a
synopsis of any sales presentation; and (8) a projected budget of
all recurring expenses.6 1 The seller also must retain a copy of all
those documents in its business records6 2 and must pay the
South Carolina Real Estate Commission a registration fee of 100
dollars.6 3 Entities registering out-of-state time shares must also
comply with the registration requirement and must pay a 250-
dollar fee.64 Any business entity that solicits in this state, by
phone, mail, or otherwise, is required to register with the Com-
mission as well. As of November 1985, approximately twenty
out-of-state time shares were registered in South Carolina. 65
Before a plan can be registered, the seller must satisfy cer-
tain conditions set out in the statute. After receipt of an applica-
tion, the Commission conducts an investigation to determine
that the plan can be conveyed and that the advertising is not
false or misleading. The Commission also investigates the seller's
background, since no plan can be registered if the seller has
been convicted of a crime involving land sales, moral turpitude,
securities violations, or fraudulent business activities within the
preceding ten years or has been subject to an injunction pertain-
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-20 (Supp. 1985).
62. Id. § 27-32-30.
63. Id. § 27-32-150(A).
64. Id. § 27-32-150(B).
65. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
538 [Vol. 37
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss3/6
TIME SHARING
ing to those activities.6 8 The burden, therefore, is on the Com-
missioner to see that the necessary disclosures have been made.
Once these onerous requirements have been met, the Commis-
sioner enters an order registering the plan.
Despite these extensive registration requirements, the Act
does not require the seller to provide the purchaser with copies
of any documents other than the sales contract.6 7 The Florida
time share act provides that even after a project is approved, it
cannot be sold unless a copy of all the required documents is
given to the purchaser."8 Perhaps it is best to leave to the Com-
missioner the job of wading through the plethora of required
documents. In the unlikely event that a consumer would be in-
terested in reading these documents, she or he can procure cop-
ies from the Commission.
D. The Buyer's Right to Cancel
A major complaint against the time-share industry has been
the use of aggressive sales tactics, and the South Carolina Act
has attempted to address this problem. Under the Act, consum-
ers who feel they were pressured into buying a time share may
cancel their contract at any time within four days.6 9 In addition,
the right of cancellation must be set forth "in close proximity to
the signature. ' 70 In the case of a lease plan, the contract may be
cancelled at any time if the accommodations are no longer avail-
able. Under an ownership plan, on the other hand, the right to
cancel is lost if three days elapse between the signing of the con-
tract and the transfer of deed."1 If accommodations are de-
stroyed or damaged, however, sellers may elect to repair them in
lieu of cancellation. 2 To protect the consumer's right to cancel,
the statute prohibits the seller from including waiver provisions
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-190(A)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1985).
67. The disclosures required in the contract are set out supra notes 40-41 and ac-
companying text.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.07 (Harrison Supp. 1984).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-40(3) (Supp. 1985). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.10 (Harri-
son Supp. 1984)(providing a 10-day cancellation period); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
103y(a) (Supp. 1985)(15-day recission period). Most states that regulate time sharing
provide for similar cancellation periods, ranging from 4 to 15 days.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-10 (Supp. 1985).
71. Id. § 27-32-40.
72. Id. § 27-32-50.
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in the contracts or soliciting waivers from purchasers 3 and per-
mits the Commission to impose a fine or require other "remedial
steps" if a seller refuses to honor the right to cancellation 4 or in
any way misrepresents the buyer's right to cancel.
7 5
In order to ensure that purchasers who cancel receive a re-
fund, sellers are required to place all funds received from a pur-
chaser into a real estate broker's trust account, and these funds
may not be withdrawn until the expiration of the four-day can-
cellation period.7 6 Although this approach is not foolproof-an
unscrupulous seller can always simply misappropriate the
money-it should protect purchasers in most cases.
The majority of complaints received by the Real Estate
Commission fall into one of two categories: either the consumer
did not receive the promised gift77 or the initial payment was
not returned after cancellation of the contract.7 8 Because of the
implicit threat of losing their time-share sales licenses, develop-
ers are generally cooperative, and the Commissioner can usually
resolve these disputes amicably. Thus, the Commissioner need
not resort to the Act's remedial provisions, and the consumer is
saved the trouble and expense of litigation.
Prior to passage of the Act, disgruntled purchasers would
have found themselves in the same situation as the plaintiffs in
Agrawal v. Rault Club Ten, Inc.7 1 In that case the aggrieved
purchasers were forced to litigate because of a fairly typical sce-
nario that, under the South Carolina Act, could probably be
handled administratively by a simple phone call. The plaintiffs,
after listening to a two-hour sales pitch, signed a time-share
agreement without reading it. Although they believed they were
signing a contract of sale, in fact, they signed a lease agreement.
When they notified the developer of their desire to cancel the
contract, he refused. They then filed suit.8 0 The court invali-
dated the time-share agreement and returned the downpayment,
but was compelled to base its decision on an obscure Louisiana
73. Id. § 27-32-110(10).
74. Id. §8 27-32-50, -120. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
75. Id. 88 27-32-70, -120.
76. Id. 8 27-32-60(3)(a)-(b).
77. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
78. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
79. 464 So. 2d 951 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
80. Id. at 952.
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civil doctrine of "error as to motive."81 Although the purchasers
could have cancelled their contract easily under Louisiana's re-
cently enacted time-sharing act, 2 the agreement was signed
prior to the act's enactment date, and the court refused to give
it retroactive effect.
The Agrawal case illustrates how effectively a cancellation
provision can resolve minor disputes and protect consumers who
have fallen prey to a sales pitch. Although the purchaser's down-
payment was only 1,040 dollars, 3 they were forced to undertake
expensive litigation, including an appeal. If this case had oc-
curred in South Carolina, the developer probably would not
have refused Agrawal's request for a refund because the loss
from possible license forfeiture would have outweighed any gain
from a single sale. Even if the developer had refused to cancel
the contract and return the money, the purchasers could still
have avoided litigation because of the Real Estate Commis-
sioner's remedial powers under South Carolina's statute.84
E. Escrow Requirement
Another consumer protection provision in the South Caro-
lina Act is the requirement that fifty percent of all cash received
from purchasers of vacation time-sharing lease plans be placed
in escrow to satisfy the underlying mortgage, liens, and encum-
brances.85 In practice, however, the Real Estate Commission re-
quires the developer to place one hundred percent of the cash
into escrow, even though this requirement appears to contravene
the statute. Cash flow analyses have shown that, because of the
large outlays of developers, including costly marketing expendi-
tures, fifty percent is simply not-adequate to cover the underly-
ing mortgages. The one hundred percent escrow account is still
no guarantee that the underlying mortgage will be covered, but
can provide much more assurance to consumers. Because of the
high amount at risk, developers are less likely to mismanage the
81. Id. at 953.
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:1131.13 (1986) provides for a right to cancel. The statute
was approved by the legislature on July 14, 1983, four months after the time-share agree-
ment was signed on March 12, 1983. 464 So. 2d at 953.
83. 464 So. 2d at 952.
84. See infra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
85. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-90 (Supp. 1985).
1986]
15
Brodie: Regulation of Time Sharing in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
purchaser's money. The Commission spot audits these escrow
accounts, and the discovery of any misappropriation could result
in revocation of the time-share or broker license and a possible
prison sentence for the developer.8 6
F. Licensing Requirement
In an attempt to rehabilitate the time-share industry's rep-
utation, the Act includes extensive seller licensing provisions. 7
A time-share seller must have a good reputation for honesty and
truthfulness and a good credit history, must be employed by a
licensed real estate broker, and must consent, irrevocably, to the
jurisdiction of the South Carolina courts. In addition, applicants
must pass an examination on the time-share statute and related
topics.88
South Carolina's licensing requirements, however, may be
overinclusive. They apply to "[a]nyone desiring to act as a seller
of vacation time sharing plans,"8 9 including time-share licenses.
Arguably, a time-share license is not an interest in land, but a
contractual interest. In practical terms, however, the time-share
license is the same as a lease, which is an interest in real estate.
Furthermore, the Act's definition of "seller" is so broad that an
employee who merely makes promotional telephone solicitations
for time-share licenses apparently must be licensed. 0 In Boise
Cascade Home and Land Corp. v. Division of New Jersey Real
Estate Commission,91 a New Jersey court ruled that a devel-
oper's telephone solicitors were required to be licensed.
Although it may appear overly burdensome to require all of
86. Id. §§ 27-32-90,-120.
87. Id. § 27-32-180.
88. Id. § 27-32-180(A)-(B).
89. Id. § 27-32-180(A).
90. The Act defines a "seller" as
any business entity, including but not limited to agents, dealers, distributors,
franchisors, subsidiaries, assignees, resellers, brokers or any other representa-
tives thereof who, for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, negoti-
ates or attempts to negotiate the listing, sale, auction, purchase, exchange or
lease of any real estate or the improvements thereon or collects rents or at-
tempts to collect rent, or who advertises or holds himself out as engaged in any
of the foregoing activities ....
Id. § 27-32-10(7).
91. 121 N.J. Super 228, 296 A.2d 545 (Ch. Div. 1972).
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a developer's employees to obtain a time-share license, this pro-
vision was included in South Carolina's statute for several good
reasons. First, it assures consumers that all personnel involved
in a project are knowledgeable about the Act and the time-shar-
ing concept. Second, as the court noted in Boise Cascade, licens-
ing laws protect consumers from "fraud, incompetence, misinter-
pretation and sharp or unconscionable practice.
'92 Most
importantly, the rigid prerequisites of the licensing requirement
should ferret out unscrupulous sellers and provide an incentive
to other sellers to avoid deceptive practices. Applicants who do
not have a reputation for honesty will not even qualify to take
the license exam. Once they have licenses, developers will be re-
luctant to engage in unethical practices and risk revocation.
G. Continuing Management of Developments
The Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act contains several pro-
visions intended to ensure ongoing management of time-share
developments. First, the seller is required, at his or her own ex-
pense, to provide liability and casualty insurance for the accom-
modations and facilities in an amount equal to their replace-
ment cost. Second, the seller must deposit in an escrow account
sufficient funds to pay all taxes and assessments levied against
the project. The seller may, however, provide that the escrow
account be handled by an association or duly appointed agent
representing the owners to pay the costs for maintenance, re-
pairs, management fees, taxes, and assessments.9 3 Thus, the Act
requires proper handling of a maintenance fee account as well as
the establishment of reserves for repair and replacement.
Although the Act provides that time-share projects be prop-
erly maintained and managed, it never expressly requires the
creation of an owners' association or other form of management
entity. As a result, the seller could manage the project with little
or no attention to the owners' desires. The drafters probably
thought that the disclosure and the specific management re-
quirements would provide management with adequate incentive
to represent the interests of consumers.
92. Id. at 240, 296 A.2d at 551.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-90(3) (Supp. 1985).
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H. Remedies for Consumer Complaints
The Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act provides efficient and
inexpensive remedies for purchasers who have been subjected to
unethical practices or other violations of the Act. Inevitably, dis-
putes will arise that will require litigation, but the majority of
complaints can be easily resolved through the channels provided
by the Act.
1. Typical Complaints
The South Carolina Real Estate Commission receives a few
hundred consumer complaints each year.9 4 The most common
ones fall within three categories: sales tactics and techniques,
premiums or gifts, and cancellation problems.
In the sales tactics category, complaints include high pres-
sure sales techniques, misleading representations regarding re-
sale potential, rent, or amenities, and nondisclosure or other
misrepresentations." The practice of paying marketing employ-
ees on a commission basis increases the incentive to make false
or misleading promises in order to close a deal. In addition, un-
dercapitalized developers may purposely hire high pressure sales
people to increase sales. One recurring problem is statements by
some sellers about the ease in swapping time shares to spend a
week at a different resort.96 Although such swapping is an added
feature of many time shares, it is frequently difficult for a time-
share owner to trade weeks because exchange networks usually
require that the week and resort the time-share owner trades be
as desirable as the ones received in exchange. When purchasers
are induced to buy a time share through such misleading sales
pitches, it is inevitable that many will be dissatisfied after the
sale. Unfortunately, exchange networks are not adequately cov-
ered under the South Carolina statute. The purchaser has a stat-
utory remedy only if the seller misrepresented "the conditions
under which a customer may exchange his rights to an accom-
modation in one location for rights to an accommodation in an-
94. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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other location. '97
Another common source of complaints is the practice of of-
fering gifts to potential buyers. Consumers often complain that
the premiums or gift awards offered are overvalued or that the
purchaser was informed that either the item was out of stock or
the purchaser was not qualified to receive it s8 Although the Act
does not explicitly address promises for unavailable gifts, a seri-
ous complaint about this promotional device could come under
the catch-all provision, which makes it a violation of the Act to
"[d]o any other act which constitutes fraud, misrepresentation
or failure to make a disclosure of a material fact."99
The Act does expressly prohibit two common practices em-
ployed in connection with premiums or gift awards. First, it is a
violation to use a promotional device without fully disclosing
that it is being used to solicit the sale of time shares.100 Second,
it is a violation to use devices to obtain the names of prospective
purchasers without disclosing that the names will be used to so-
licit sales.101
The following excerpt is taken from an actual mail solicita-
tion for the sale of a time share in Garden City, South Carolina:
If married, both you and your spouse must take an informative
inspection tour of the - Beach Club.. . . Upon comple-
tion of your inspection tour .... you will then receive your
awards .... All awards in this program are guaranteed to be
awarded .... This is promotional material being used for the
purpose of soliciting the sale of interval ownership periods.
This advertisement poses two problems. First, it is a potential
source for consumer complaints because of the statement that
the gifts are "guaranteed." Inevitably, someone will not receive
the promised award. Either an individual will be judged ineligi-
ble-perhaps because not credit worthy-or the seller will run
out of gifts. A second, and more serious defect is the reference to
"interval ownership periods." The statute refers, consistently, to
"vacation time sharing plans," not to "interval ownership peri-
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-110(a) (Supp. 1985) provides that such a misrepresenta-
tion is a violation of the Act.
98. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-110(11) (Supp. 1985).
100. Id. § 27-32-110(1).
101. Id. § 27-32-110(2).
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ods." In addition, there is only one reference to interval owner-
ship in the Real Estate Commission regulations.102 Most impor-
tantly, the ordinary consumer probably does not even know
what interval ownership is. Most complaints about gift offers
arise because unsuspecting consumers go on a tour to receive a
free gift and are badgered into buying a time share.
2. Power of the Commission to Investigate and Fine
Developers
Fortunately for consumers, the statute provides for a rela-
tively easy resolution of their problems. The process starts when
the consumer complains to the South Carolina Real Estate Com-
mission. The Commission then sends the complaint to the devel-
oper. Next, the Commission conducts an investigation to deter-
mine whether a violation occurred and how serious it was. At
this point, the Commissioner may dismiss the complaint or may
determine that the violation was only minor and assess a mone-
tary fine. 0 3 The Commissioner also has discretion to require
"other remedial steps." If the person does not pay the fine or
reach some "other remedial agreement" within ten days, the
Commissioner can request that the Attorney General prose-
cute.l0 4 This section of the statute grants the Commissioner
enormous power over time-share developers: he can levy a fine
or threaten prosecution simply on the basis of an investigation.
The mere threat of using this section's powers has been instru-
mental in curbing abusive practices in the industry. If any viola-
tion is found to involve bad faith or dishonesty, then the Com-
missioner can send notice of an administrative hearing before
the Commissioner and assess all costs of investigation and
prosecution. 0 5
3. Recovery Fund
Any dissatisfied customer who wishes to cancel a contract
can avoid the necessity of formal proceedings by requesting the
102. S.C. Real Estate Comm'n R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 105-40(B) (1976).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-120 (Supp. 1985).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 27-32-150(D).
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Commission to apply pressure to the seller. Under the Act, the
purchaser has the option to cancel the contract and obtain a full
refund whenever a time share has been sold in violation of the
Act's provisions. 10 6 If the purchaser can show actual damages,
yet another remedy is available: the purchaser can seek compen-
sation from the "South Carolina Vacation Time Sharing Recov-
ery Fund." This fund, mandated by the statute, is made up of
annual fees paid by all licensees. 107 So far, there has been no
need to use the fund, primarily because developers have been
willing to settle purchasers' grievances rather than risk losing
their licenses.
The procedure for recovery from the fund is different from
the cancellation procedure. The consumer must make a demand
to the seller for damages based on a specific violation of the Act,
and the seller must refuse the demand. Further, the Act imposes
a one-year statute of limitations and provides that the applicant
cannot be contributorily responsible.0 8 After the seller's refusal,
the consumer must file an application for recovery with the
Commission, which then forwards the complaint to the devel-
oper. If the developer and consumer cannot settle the dispute,
an administrative hearing date is arranged.'0 9 The dispute is
heard before an arbitration panel consisting of one member se-
lected by the consumer, one by the developer, and one by the
Commission. The decision of the Board of Arbitrators is final
and binding."0
4. Other Available Remedies
When an immediate remedy is needed, the Commission can
apply immediate pressure through fines. In addition, the Com-
mission, through the South Carolina Attorney General, may
bring an action in the circuit court for an injunction or a tempo-
rary restraining order."' The Commission also has the power to
issue cease and desist orders and to take any other affirmative
action the Commissioner deems necessary to carry out the pur-
106. Id. § 27-32-120.
107. Id. § 27-32-200.
108. Id. § 27-32-210(A).
109. Id. § 27-32-210(C).
110. Id. § 27-32-230(A).
111. Id. § 27-32-190(B)(3).
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pose of the statute if a seller is found to have done any of the
following: (1) violated any provision of the statute or any Com-
mission rule or order; (2) engaged in any deceptive promotions
or sales methods; or (3) substantially altered its development or
sales plan after registration without prior written approval from
the Commission.1 2 For example, in response to charges of mis-
appropriations of money, the Commission brought a criminal ac-
tion against three Horry County Developers.' 3 The Commission
has also fined developers up to 15,000 dollars for blatant viola-
tions.1 4 Developers readily pay the fines in order to protect their
licenses from revocation, even though the statute provides that a
wilful violation is a misdemeanor." 5
Although the Commission is responsible for enforcing the
statute, the purchasers are not foreclosed from bringing private
actions.116 If all else fails, the consumer is always free to litigate.
The obvious legislative intent, however, was to save the con-
sumer from needless litigation. The extensive remedial provi-
sions of the Act not only discourage abusive practices, but also
encourage efficient dispute resolution. At this time, there is no
record of any actions having been brought under the Act in the
South Carolina courts.
V. DEVELOPER INSOLVENCY
Although the Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act is an impor-
tant piece of legislation that has saved an innovative concept
from unethical exploitation, some problems still remain. Of ma-
jor concern to time-share purchasers is the possibility of devel-
oper insolvency and its effect on their interests.
A. The Special Problems of Right-to-Use Time Shares
The seriousness of the insolvency problem was underscored
by a disturbing decision in In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. v.
Allman. 17 In that case, Sombrero Reef, the debtor, had sold
112. Id. § 27-32-190(D)(1).
113. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
114. Id.
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-120 (Supp. 1985).
116. Id. § 27-32-130.
117. 18 Bankr. 612 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
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about 200 time share purchase agreements in a resort marina
complex in the Florida Keys before filing for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11.118 All the purchasers had signed right-to-use time
contracts, which the court classified as executory.119 Under sec-
tion 365 of the Bankruptcy Code,120 the bankruptcy trustee was
not obligated to honor the executory contracts, but could sell the
units to third parties free of the purchasers' interests. As a re-
sult, the purchasers were relegated to the status of unsecured
creditors.
An executory contract has been defined as one "under
which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to
the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach.
121
Although some of the purchasers in Sombrero Reef had paid the
purchase price in full, the court determined that these contracts
were executory because the purchaser still had to pay annual
dues122 and the debtor had an obligation to maintain the prop-
erty and provide services. 23
Under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, unexpired leases
and contracts for the sale of real property are given special pro-
tection. Subsections (h) and (i) provide that if the trustee rejects
contracts for the sale of real property 24 or unexpired leases of
real property, 2 5 the purchasers or lessors may elect either to
treat the agreements as terminated or to remain in possession.1 26
The court in Sombrero Reef found that the right-to-use con-
tracts were neither unexpired leases nor contracts for the sale of
real property. No delivery of title was contemplated, and the
contracts specifically stated that purchasers had no interest in
the property other than the right to reserve and occupy accom-
modations. As additional support, the court looked at the lan-
guage of section 365, which refers to the sale of real property
118. Id. at 614-15.
119. Id. at 617.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (West Supp. 1985).
121. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy (pt. 1), 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973).
122. The purchase price varied from $1,000 to $3,000; the annual dues ranged from
$42 to $84, with an inflationary adjustment.
123. 18 Bankr. at 614, 616.
124. Id. at 617 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1976)).
125. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. 365(i)(1) (1976)).
126. 18 Bankr. at 617.
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and not merely of an interest or estate in property. Although
the lease exception posed a closer question, the court deter-
mined that purchasers received a right to obtain accommoda-
tions rather than a right to occupy certain real estate. Since pur-
chasers would have little use for the rooms without the
accompanying services, the right to use was a small part of the
bargain and the agreement was, therefore, not a lease. 127
The unfair result reached in Sombrero Reef appeared to be
the death knell for right-to-use time sharing since right-to-use
purchasers would rarely be able to recover their purchase price
in bankruptcy proceedings. Just six and a half months after
Sombrero Reef, however, the Senate intiated action to resolve
the bankruptcy dilemma,' 28 and Congress eventually enacted the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.129
This act amended section 365 to specifically include time-share
interests.'30 Under new section 365(h)(1), the right-to-use pur-
chaser may treat the contract as terminated or remain in posses-
sion for the balance of the term. A purchaser who remains in
possession may offset against the rent the damages occurring af-
ter rejection of the contract.131
Despite the amendments to section 365, the right-to-use
purchaser still faces one potential problem, which was suggested
in the Sombrero Reef opinion:
Section 365(h) does not make a distinction between leases
where the lessee is in possession and where he is not, but im-
plies the necessity of possession by referring to a lessee re-
maining in possession. Possession is not defined. If these time
share contracts were leases, it might be that they would be de-
nied protection under subsection (h) because the defendants
were not "in possession." However, given the concept of con-
structive possession and possession by agents which might be
encompassed in §365(h), the court does not vote on that
basis. 132
New section 365(h), which now specifically includes right-to-use
127. Id. at 617-19.
128. See Comment, supra note 7, at 609-11.
129. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 84 Stat. 333 (1984).
130. See M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 5A.02[2].
131. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
132. 18 Bankr. at 618-19 (emphasis in original).
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purchasers, also refers to the lessee remaining in possession. As
the court pointed out, the constructive possession or possession
by agents concepts may suffice to bring right-to-use purchasers
within the statute. 33
Prior to the amendments to section 365, many states at-
tempted to circumvent the bankruptcy problem by requiring
nondisturbance clauses in time-share leases.3 According to one
authority,
A nondisturbance clause is an agreement by the lender or lien
holders to release the purchaser from any obligation for re-
maining liens or mortgages against the property of the devel-
oper. The developer will not be allowed to sell or further mort-
gage the property unless the new purchaser, lender or lien
holder agrees to accept the property as it currently exists. (i.e.
subject to the present right-to-use interests). The lender or
purchaser must also agree not to disturb the time-share pur-
chaser in his quiet possession and enjoyment of the property.
13
The court in Sombrero Reef, however, held that "the non-distur-
bance agreements and provisions do not create a protectible in-
terest under § 365(h) or (i) where one does not exist other-
wise."'1 6 Now that section 365(h) explicitly creates protectible
interests in time shares, the nondisturbance clauses would, pre-
sumably, be effective, but superfluous. The point, however, is
that many right-to-use purchasers at Sombrero Reef probably
relied on the nondisturbance clauses to protect their interest in
the event of financial troubles.. 37 Thus, even conscientious pur-
chasers who read their agreements could be buying worthless
contracts. The insolvency problem will not be limited to those
states that do not adequately provide for the financial stability
of developers. Even if a state attempts to ensure financial stabil-
ity, the result may be a mere chimera of protection, as was the
case with Florida's mandatory nondisturbance clause
requirement.
The South Carolina Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act does
not provide for nondisturbance clauses. Instead, the statute at-
133. Id. at 618-19.
134. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08(e) (Harrison 1983).
135. M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 5A.01[1].
136. 18 Bankr. at 619.
137. Rock, supra note 4, at 126.
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tempts to prevent financial problems by requiring escrow ac-
counts to provide funds for outstanding indebtedness.'31 In 1982,
however, when the Governor's Club Resort in Myrtle Beach filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11,131 the right-to-use owners en-
tered an agreement under which they gave up their interest for
one year in return for the grant of a leasehold interest. Although
the time-share owners did not suffer a total loss, as in Sombrero
Reef, they did sustain significant impairment of their interests,
despite legislation addressing the problem.
B. The General Problems for All Time-Share Owners
Fee time-share interests have always been protected in
bankruptcy proceedings because the purchasers actually receive
title to the property. Transfer of title constitutes a sale of real
property protected even under the old section 365(i). The sec-
tion was amended, however, to specifically include "the sale of a
timeshare interest under a timeshare plan."1
40
Fee time shares are not immune, however, from other
problems arising from the financial instability of developers. If a
project bankrupts and the time-share owner elects to retain pos-
session under section 365(i), the question remains of who is go-
ing to provide and pay for accompanying services such as main-
tenance and management. It is certainly unlikely that the
bankrupt resort will be able to continue furnishing such services.
Although section 365(i) permits the owners to offset any dam-
ages against payments under the contract, the owners still must
organize in order to provide maintenance, mail delivery, utilities,
and other services that the developer would be responsible for
under the contract. Even if the owners are capable of organizing
themselves, some will no doubt elect to terminate their con-
tracts, leaving higher costs for a smaller group to pay. 4'
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-32-95 (Supp. 1985).
139. See M. HENZE, supra note 15, § 5A.05.
140. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 84 Stat. 333 (1984).
141. If, for example, half the owners at the Governor's Club Resort elected to termi-
nate the average maintenance fee of $200 per owner, it would have left an additional
$80,000 for the remaining 400 owners to absorb. In fact, one owners' association felt the
maintenance fees on just 25 units were enough to justify a lawsuit. In Colony Council Bd.
of Directors v. Hightower Enters., 228 Va. 197, 319 S.E.2d 772 (1984), the developer
reacquired 25 units after purchasers defaulted, then refused to pay the assessments and
maintenance fees on those units. Although the case never specified the amount of the
26
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A similar problem may occur if a financially insecure devel-
oper, in an effort to boost sales, sets maintenance fees at levels
insufficient to cover operating costs. When the project is turned
over to the owners' association, either because all the units have
been sold or because the developer has filed for bankruptcy, the
owners inherit a deficit and insufficient reserves. This was prob-
ably the case in Sombrero Reef, where maintenance fees ranged
from forty-two to eighty-four dollars.142 In Sombrero Reef, how-
ever, the resort was never turned over to the owners so they did
not have to deal with the problem of an operating deficit.
VI. THE FUTURE OF TiME SHARING
A. Passage of Management to the Owners' Association
Probably the largest question facing the time-share industry
in the future is what will happen when ownership passes from
the developer to the owners' association.143 According to Tom
Bell, staff attorney for the Florida Department of Business Reg-
ulation, "By and large, state statutes don't adequately address
the financial stability of the developer or how long term manage-
ment will be handled, and that's the wave of problems in the
future.1 44 Once ownership passes to the owners' association, the
developer may be relieved of all legal liability. Even if an escrow
account has been properly maintained, the developer may have
been assessing unrealistically low maintenance fees that did not
cover actual operating costs. Some time-share agreements pro-
tect the purchasers by requiring the developer to make up the
deficit between the sums paid by other owners and the actual
costs of operation and maintenance.14 5 If, however, the agree-
ments contain no such requirement, the purchasers and the
fees, the owners' association felt that their increased financial burden was sufficient to
bring a declaratory judgment proceeding and to appeal the decision to the Virginia Su-
preme Court.
142. 18 Bankr. at 614.
143. Of course, the owners' association members may decide to retain the developer
as manager after they have assumed control. If not, the association may choose an inde-
pendent management firm. In either situation, there is a real need for professional man-
agement to insure that the money is collected and properly spent.
144. See Rock, supra note 4, at 125.
145. Colony Council Bd. of Directors v. Hightower Enters., 228 Va. 197, 198, 319
S.E.2d at 772, 773.
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owners' association may be without any recourse against the de-
veloper once all the units have been sold.
One possible solution would be a provision similar to the
one in Florida's Real Estate Time Sharing Act, which imposes
on the developer a statutory duty to "supervise, manage and
control all aspects of a time-share plan.1146 If the developer has
been intentionally assessing inadequate fees, without making up
the difference, the owners might be able to bring an action for
breach of the statutory duty to manage the time-share plan. For
example, if the developer had not gone into bankruptcy in Som-
brero Reef, he probably could have been held in violation of his
duty to manage for failure to assess adequate fees to maintain
and operate the facility. 147 In practice, however, the owners may
not discover the insufficient reserves until it is too late. Once
control has passed to the owners' association, it is questionable
whether the developer can still be held accountable.
The problem is heightened in South Carolina where there is
no statutory requirement that the developer organize an owners'
association. Although it is in the developer's best interest to es-
tablish an association, inevitably many will not do so. Most
time-share owners automatically form an owners' association
that, presumably, will assume control when all the units have
been sold. Once the owners' association begins managing the
time-share plan, the developer has no further responsibility
under the South Carolina statute, provided the escrow account
has been properly maintained and the other statutory require-
ments have been met. Because the South Carolina statute does
not contemplate long term management problems, all of the
problems that initially gave time sharing a bad name would
again be unregulated.
Another solution might be to impose on the developer a
statutory fiduciary duty to manage and control the project,
which would be analogous to the fiduciary duty of the escrow
agent to the purchasers under Florida's Time Share Act.148
When all the units are sold, that duty would be assumed by the
entity replacing the developer. Whatever solution is selected, the
problem must be addressed within the next few years, when
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08 (Harrison Supp. 1984).
147. 18 Bankr. at 614.
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08 (Harrison Supp. 1984).
[Vol. 37
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss3/6
TIME SHARING
time-share owners' associations begin to assume management of
the developments. So far, only a few projects in South Carolina
have passed into the hands of owners' assocations. 49
B. Redefining Time Sharing
The definition of time sharing needs reconsideration. Time
sharing is a relatively new concept and has no time-worn princi-
ples on which parties can rely. Because of increased regulation,
the industry is now seeking new forms of transferring interests
that will not be classified as time sharing under existing regula-
tory statutes. Currently, there is considerable debate over how
to distinguish between time sharing and "multiple ownership."
For example, if seven people get together and buy a 770,000-
dollar vacation home at Lake Tahoe and each pays 110 dollars
for seven weeks a year, is this arrangement time sharing or is it
multiple ownership? What if some of the owners decide to rent
out a few of their weeks each year? Are they time sharing?
These are just a few of the questions that need to be addressed
as time sharing is given a more precise definition.
VII. CONCLUSION
Time sharing is a relatively new concept that has overcome
many barriers to gain approval. Initially, the time-sharing indus-
try was troubled by fraud and racketeering, later by bankrupt-
cies and time shares with no resale market, and now by the un-
certainties of long term management and the need for
redefinition. Yet the public is becoming more educated and is
beginning to realize that honest time-share developers do exist.
Time sharing is a boon for middle class families that like to va-
cation one week every year, but cannot afford to buy their own
vacation home or pay the rising costs of hotel accommodations.
Because it is a coastal state, South Carolina recognized and ad-
dressed the problems at an early stage, in time to save a worth-
while concept from its tainted image. 150 Although time sharing's
149. Hagreen Interview, supra note 8.
150. As one commentator described this image: "To Gardner [Presiding Justice on
the California Appellate Court] property owned by time-sharing is tantamount to being
a nuisance per se that should be driven, together with liquor stores, massage parlors, and
mobile homes, beyond the limits of respectability." August, supra note 2, at 213.
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reputation is not yet totally rehabilitated, comprehensive legisla-
tion such as South Carolina's Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act
has done much to raise the public's perception of the time-share
industry. Of course, unsolved problems and unanswered ques-
tions remain, but time sharing will continue to grow, and South
Carolina, like all states, must move quickly to keep pace.
Michelle D. Brodie
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